The North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act by Van Hecke, M. T.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 10 | Number 1 Article 5
12-1-1931
The North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act
M. T. Van Hecke
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
M. T. Van Hecke, The North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act, 10 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1931).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol10/iss1/5
THE NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACT
M. T. VAN HECKE*
The new Declaratory Judgment Act' introduces to our judicial
administration a device whose utility can best be seen through con-
trast with familiar local procedures and a sampling of the experience
of other states.
It differs from an advisory opinion 2 in three respects. That serv-
ice is rendered only to the legislative or executive branch of the state
government; no question of fact may be involved; and the opinion
is not binding. A declaratory judgment, however, is available to all
classes of litigants without regard to their public or private status;
issues of fact3 as well as of law may be litigated; juries4 are avail-
able as in other cases; and the declaration has "the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree.""
The device is distinguished from a controversy without action in
two ways. Under the statute8 creating that procedure, the facts
have to be agreed upon and the case must have been capable of being
the subject of a civil action with a right to a judgment for conse-
quential relief. ". .. the purpose is simply to dispense with the formal-
ities of a summons, complaint, and answer, and upon an agreed state
of facts to submit the case to the court for decision and.., the judge
shall... render judgment thereon as if an action were depending. ' 7
Today, however, a declaratory judgment may be obtained in a con-
* Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of North
Carolina.1 P. L. 1931, Ch. 102.
'Note (1929), Advisory Opinioni in North Carolina, 7 N. C. L. Rav. 449.
Compare Cohoon v. State, 201 N. C. 312, 160 S. E. 183 (1931) (recommenda-
tory jurisdiction of Supreme Court on claims against the State).
P. L. 1931, Ch. 102, §§9, 10. For various attitudes toward settling disputed
questions of fact, under statutes differing from the Uniform Act, see annota-
tions in 12 A. L. R. 72 and 68 A. L. R. 119. An excellent case is Muskegon
Hts. v. Danigelis, 253 Mich. 260, 235 N. W. 83, 73 A. L. R. 696 (1931). Com-
pare Transport Oil Co. v. Bush, 1 Pac. (2d) 1060 (1931) (oral contract).
'Ibid.
Ibid., §1.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §626 and annotations; McINxosH, N. C.
PRAC. & PROc. (1929), 294, 555-557. For a case combining an agreed state of
facts and a declaratory judgment, see Joplin Waterworks Co. v. Jasper County,
38 S. W. (2d) 1068 (Mo., 1931).
'Pearson, C. J., in McKethan v. Ray, 71 N. C. 165 (1874), quoted in Burton
v. Durham Realty Co., 188 N. C. 473, 125 S. E. 3 (1924).
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troversy without action. For the whole point of the innovation is
that no cause of action, as for damages, specific performance, posses-
sion, criminal prosecution, injunction, or what not, need exist. The
relief is anticipatory, to prevent the necessity for a breach of contract
or covenant, the commission of a tort or a crime, or any other vio-
lation of a duty, before the legal relations of the parties may be
determined.
In fact, however, under the statute authorizing the controversy
without action, the North Carolina court has on occasion rendered
what might be called left-handed declaratory judgments. In Farth-
ing v. Carrington,8 decided in 1895, no cause of action existed, and
normally the case would have been dismissed. Instead, no formal
disposition was made of the appeal from an adverse result below by
the party raising the question of law. But, relying upon an advisory
opinion to the Governor as a precedent, the court treated the matter
"as in the nature of a submission of the controversy without a formal
action," and determined the construction of a statute relating to
preferences between creditors. The late Chief Justice Clark dissented
on the ground that the court had in effect, and without statutory
authority, entered a declaratory judgment. In Hicks v. Greene
County,9 decided in 1930, the necessary factor of a cause of action
was again found to be missing. The court held that it was without
jurisdiction and dismissed the proceeding, but went on, nevertheless,
to determine the validity of a county bond issue under conflicting
statutes.
The Declaratory Judgment Act adopts the idea of the equity juris-
diction of the Superior Courts1 0 to entertain requests from executors
and trustees for instructions and extends that service to trusts and
to estates of deceased persons, infants, lunatics and insolvents,
whether the question is raised by the fiduciary, the creditor, devisee,
legatee, heir, next of kin, cestui que trust, or other person interested.
The question may involve the ascertainment of classes of creditors,
devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; directions to fidu-
8116 N. C. 315, 22 S. E. 9 (1895). And see Burton v. Durham Realty Co.,
supra note 7.200 N. C. 73, 156 S. E. 164 (1930). Compare Muskegon Hts. v. Danigelis,
supra note 3 (declaratory judgment as to validity city bonds).
0 Haywood v. Wachovia Loan and Trust Co., 149 N. C. 208, 62 S. E. 915
(1908); Commercial National Bank v. Alexander, 188 N. C. 667, 125 S. E. 385
(1924); Mountain Park Inst. v. Lovill, 198 N. C. 642, 153 S. E. 114 (1930) ;
Finley v. Finley, 201 N. C. 1, 158 S. E. 549 (1931) ; McINTosH, N. C. PRAc. &
PROC. (1929), 68.
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ciaries with reference to official acts; or any questions arising in the
administration of wills and other writings."
The declaration may be of rights, status or other legal relations,
whether or not other relief is or could be claimed, under contracts,
deeds, wills, franchises, ordinances, statutes or other instruments. It
may be affirmative or negative in character. And the above enumera-
tion of items of subject matter is not intended to be exclusive. In-
stead, the jurisdiction is to exist in any situation where the judgment
will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. If the
judgment will not, in the discretion of the court, have that effect, he
may refuse to act.' 2
Procedures similar to that established by this new North Carolina
enactment have been known to the Chinese law13 for a thousand
years, in Scotland for four centuries, in England and Canada14 since
the 1880s, and in the United States since 1919.1r Congress has not
yet provided for declaratory judgments in the federal courts, but
approximately thirty states have adopted legislation authorizing such
proceedings in state courts. These statutes vary considerably in de-
tail.16 The North Carolina law is that submitted in 1922 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
since enacted with some local modifications in more than fourteen
states. -7 Section ten of the North Carolina statute was drafted by
P. L. 1931, CIL 102, §§2, 3.
"Ibid., §§1, 2, 4, 5.
" Statement in conversation by Professor Jean Escarra, of the Faculty of
Law of the University of Paris, since 1921 one of the legal advisers to the
Chinese Republic.
" Martin, Thp Declaratory Judgment, 9 CAN. BAR REv. 540 (October, 1931).
' There were "little used and narrow statutes granting a limited power of
rendering declaratory judgments in Rhode Island (1876), Maryland (1888),
Connecticut (1893, 1915), and New Jersey (1915)." But "the first broad
statute in this country was enacted in Michigan in 1919." Borchard, The Col-
stitutionality of Declaratory Jidgments, 31 CoL. L. REv. 561, 562 (1931).
" See ibid., and FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed., 1925) §1354. E.g., the
Michigan statute originally recited: "No action or proceeding in any court of
record shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judg-
ment, decree or order is sought thereby, and the court may make binding
declarations of rights whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed,
or not." PuB. AcTs 1919, Act 150. This was founded upon the English rule
of court. See Martin, op. cit. mpra note 14. Other variations will be noted
occasionally in the text. Differences in statutory provisions should be carefully
noted in considering decisions from other jurisdictions in the United States.
Even the Uniform Act has frequently been modified, as in North Carolina, to
meet local p~ocedural habits. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, 1930 Pocket
Supplement, 112 et seq.
" Ibid.
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Professor A. C. McIntosh to adjust the procedural detail to the local
practice.
The constitutionality1 8 of state declaratory judgment statutes, as
against the charge that they impose non-judicial functions upon the
judiciary by requiring decisions on moot questions and the rendering
of advisory opinions, is now quite established. Fifteen state courts
have expressly so held,19 and twelve others have so assumed, 20 indi-
cating that the charge proceeds from a misconception of the declar-
atory judgment's nature. Michigan alone, and then in a dictum, 21
took the other view. Wisconsin repealed 22 its first statute for a sim-
ilar reason. Both Michigan and Wisconsin, however, have since
enacted new legislation. And both courts have now upheld the va-
lidity of the new statutes. 23 The Wisconsin substitute is the Uniform
'This and the next following paragraph are based upon the able discussion
by Professor Borchard of the Yale Law School, The Constituiionality of
Declaratory Judgments, 31 CoL. L. REv. 560 (April, 1931). Other discussions
of importance are: 9 UNIFORM LAws AxNOTATED, 1930 Pocket Supplement,
113; 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed., 1925) §1355; annotations in 12 A. L. R.
57, 50 A. L. R. 44, 68 A. L. R 113.
Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., 283 Pac. 281 (Ariz. 1929) ; Blakeslee v.
Wilson, 190 Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923) ; Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549,
120 Atl. 150, 152 (1923) ; Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930) ;
Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N. E. 186 (Ind. 1930) ; State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove,
109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1922) ; Black v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 233 Ky. 588, 26
S. W. (2d) 481 (1930) ; Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich.
673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930) ; Lynn v. Kearney County, 236 N. W. 192 (Nebr.,
1931) ; McCrory Stores Corp. v. S. M. Braunstein, Inc., 102 N. J. L. 590, 134
Atl. 752 (1926) ; Board of Education v. Van Zandt, 119 Misc. 124, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 234 N. Y. 644, 138 N. E. 481 (1923) ; In re
Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925); Miller v. Miller, 149
Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924) ; Patterson's Ex'rs v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113,
131 S. E. 217 (1926); City of Milwaukee v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 230 N. W.
626 (Wis. 1930).
" Colorado, Hawaii (ter.), Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, North Da-
kota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyo-
ming.
' Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920).
A statute forbade street car companies to require employees to work more than
six days a week, except in emergencies. A non-union conductor sued the com-
pany. for a declaration that he had the right to work seven days a week if he
and the company were willing. A labor union intervened and insisted upon the
enforcement of the literal terms of the statute. From a decision in favor of the
plaintiff, the union appealed. The real controversy was between the plaintiff
and the intervenor. The defendant and the plaintiff wanted the same result.
The case could have been disposed of by construing the statute as not applicable
where the original parties were not adverse. A majority of the court, however,
took the view that the statute imposed upon the judiciary non-judicial functions
and held it void.
'Note (1924) 2 Wis. L. REv. 376; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 3
UNIV. CINciNxATI L. REv. 24, 37 (1929).
Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618(1930) ; City of Milwaukee v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 230 N. W. 626 (Wis. 1930).
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Act. The Michigan substitute is the original act24 with the added
provisions "in cases of actual controversies" and that the declaration
shall have the effect of a final judgment.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has uttered
three dicta2 5 against the constitutionality of a federal declaratory
judgment act, should one be enacted. In one of these cases, Mr.
Justice Stone, concurring in the result, said: ". . . the determination
now made seems to me very similar itself to a declaratory judgment
to the effect that we could not constitutionally be authorized to give
such judgments .... -26 The state courts have restricted the effects
of these dicta to congressional legislation, and have viewed them as
without influence upon state enactments. 27 The law writers have
been unanimous in subjecting the dicta to adverse criticism. 28 The
last pronouncement of the Supreme Court, in a case involving a
North and South Carolina electric railway, is more narrowly con-
fined to a statement that the declaratory judgment was "not within
either the statutory or the equity jurisdiction of federal courts." 29
Quoted supra note 16.
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 74, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71
L. ed. 541 (1927) (Decision: Conformity Act does not make Kentucky Declar-
atory Judgment Act available in federal courts. Dictum: A declaratory judg-
ment is beyond the judicial power conferred by Art. III of the Constitution,
because it does not involve a case or controversy, and because it does involve
merely abstract questions framed to invoke the advice of the court without real
parties or issues.) Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coup.
Ass'n., 276 U. S. 71, 88-89, 48 Sup. Ct. 29l, 72 L. ed. 473 (1928) (Decision:
striking from a counterclaim in a state court action a request for a declaratory
judgment that a certain statute was unconstitutional, that statute already having
been held valid, does not present a federal question. Dictum: "Apparently the
Declaratory Judgment statute authorizes plaintiffs only to ask for judgment.
...This Court has no jurisdiction to review a mere declaratory judgment.")
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 277 U. S. 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 72
L. ed. 880 (1928) (Decision: Ambiguous meaning of clause in lease, a threat to
mortgageability of hotel property, does not constitute a cloud on title. Dictum:
"What the plaintiff seeks is simply a declaratory judgment. To grant that
relief is beyond the power of the federal judiciary ... But still the proceeding
is not a case or controversy within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitu-
tion.")
277 U. S. at p. 290.
City of Phoenix v. Pacific Constr. Co., 283 Pac. 281 (Ariz. 1929) ; Wash-
ington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930);
Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930).
'These are collected in Borchard, op. cit. supra note 18, his footnotes nos.
86, 112, 116. Professor Borchard's own criticism is the latest and the most
thorough.
' Piedmont & Northern Railway v. United States, 280 U. S. 469, 477, 50
Sup. Ct. 192, 74 L. ed 551 (1930). This view necessitated the beginning of
actual construction of the railway, and an injunction against the continuance
thereof, in order to raise the question of law at stake, i.e., whether the I. C. C.
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And the latest expression from a lower federal court, while reassert-
ing all the dicta, finds them without effect upon the equivalent of a
declaratory judgment there actually rendered in connection with a
patent.30
The mistake made by those who view the declaratory judgment
with abhorrence is the assumption that the courts are thereby re-
quired to pass upon moot causes, to answer abstract questions of law,
and to give legal advice to all who seek it without accomplishing any-
thing more. This is not so, anywhere. Instead, both by occasional
specific statutory provisions 31 and by uniform judicial construction 2
of legislation without such clauses, a bona fide controversy or dispute
between genuinely adverse parties must either exist or inevitably
threaten, as to which .the judgment will be res judicata. Thus, the
Tennessee court,33 in administering the Uniform Act (which does
not specifically recite that "an actual controversy" must exist)
adopted in 1924 the following test, previously stated in Scotland, Eng-
land and in America: ". . . the question must be a real and not a
theoretical question; the person raising it must have a real interest
to raise it; he must be able to secure the proper contradicter, that is
to say, some one presently existing who has a true interest to oppose
the declaration sought." Instances of various applications of this
restriction will appear in the following paragraphs.
It is proposed now to sample a number of the more recent declar-
atory judgment cases, most of them decided during the last year and
a half, to see the uses to which declaratory judgments have been put,
and the various obstacles, procedural and otherwise, encountered in
their administration. Comment has been withheld but it is hoped
that the juxtaposition of the cases may stimulate critical analysis.
Contracts. The Nebraska court3 4 determined the capacity of a
had jurisdiction. See I. C. C. v. Piedmont & N. Ry. Co., 51 F. (2d) 766(W. D. S. C., 1931).
' Cleveland Trust Co. v. Nelson, 52 F. (2d) 276 (E. D. Mich., 1931).
'E.g., see KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§60-3127; CAL. CODES Or CIV.
PRoc. (Deering, 1923) §1060; VA. CODE ANN. (1930) §6140a; Ky. CODES (Car-
roll, 1927) §§639a, 1, 2.
'E.g., see Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150 (1923); In re
Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925) ; Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn.
463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924). The earlier cases are collected in annotations in 50
A. L. R. 45, and 68 A. L. R. 116.
"Miller v. Miller, supra note 32. See also, Perry v. Elizabethton, 160 Tenn.
102, 22 S. W. (2d) 359 (1929) (absence of a defendant with an adversary
interest is a jurisdictional defect).
"Lynn v. Kearney County, 236 N. W. 192 (Neb., 1931). The interest of
the plaintiff is not reported.
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county to enter into contracts with its townships whereby the county
would take over the construction and maintenance of township roads.
Similarly, an Arizona court, 35 at the instance of a city, expressed
itself as quite willing to undertake to construe a paving contract en-
tered into with a construction company, one of the defendants, though
it deferred action until non-resident as well as the resident property
owners could be made parties. And the New York court,3 6 upon
the petition of a town board, went so far into the construction of a
contract for public improvements, that it issued a declaration as to
the interests of the contractor, his surety, a sub-contractor, and of
certain water commissioners who asserted claims for repairing and
changing sewers.
But the New York court refused37 to permit the declaratory judg-
ment proceeding to be used to establish an equitable lien and to obtain
a money judgment, where a broker who had sold an industrial plant
was suing the vendor and vendee to determine the value of his services
after a tender of a certain amount had been refused. And the same
court,38 as between a stockbroker and his customer, refused to permit
the declaratory judgment to be used as a substitute for the Arbitra-
tion Act to ascertain whether a controversy existed under a contract
providing that any controversy should be settled by arbitration. The
plaintiff contended that none did exist. An action for balance due
on margins had already been instituted.
Deeds. All but one of the recent declaratory judgment cases in-
volving deeds, have resulted adversely to the petitioners. In that one
case,3 9 plaintiff had acquired property which defendant alleged was
conveyed in fraud of creditors. Plaintiff had executed a mortgage to
a third person in good faith. Defendant is proceeding with execution
against the property. The status of the mortgage was determined
by a Pennsylvania declaration.
The illfated cases went off on these grounds: A judgment creditor
who sought a declaration to quiet the debtor's title was referred in
California40 to an execution. A creditor without lien in Virginia did
not have a sufficient interest in the land to sustain a declaration that
" City of Phoenix v. Pacific Constr. Co., 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 281 (1929).
Greece v. Murray, 130 Misc. 55, 223 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1927).
'* James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401 (1931).
" Newburger v. Lubell, 232 App. Div. 501, 250 N. Y. Supp. 363 (1931).
"Conemaugh Iron Wks. v. Delano Coal Co., 298 Pa. 182, 148 Aft. 94(1929).
' Stenzil v. Kronick, 102 Cal. App. 507, 283 Pac. 93 (1929).
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debtor's deed was void for want of recordation. 41 A city to which
land had been conveyed on certain conditions could not have a dec-
laration in Michigan as to the validity and effect of the conditions, no
act likely to invoke the conditions being contemplated save the laying
out of gas, water, lighting and telephone facilities, the condition
against these being obviously a nullity.4 2 Where a prospective pur-
chaser from plaintiff refused to take land because of building re-
strictions which every other owner except defendant had waived,
plaintiff's remedy was held in New Jersey to be specific performance
against the purchaser, instead of a declaration against defendant.43
And a declaration as to the effect of building restrictions upon plain-
tiff was denied in New York because of the absence from the list of
party defendants of other owners of parts of the tract.44
Estates. The Tennessee court dismissed the proceedings for lack
of proper parties where an alleged distributee sought a declaration
as against a New York personal representative, the Tennessee ad-
ministrator not being joined, as to who were distributees.4 Rival
claims to the property of a decedent which prevented the executrix
from borrowing money were held in Pennsylvania to entitle the
executrix to a declaration, a bona fide controversy being either ex-
istent or immediately threatening.4 6 But where the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust had a twenty year expectancy, a Tennessee court
refused the trustee a declaration as to whether a judgment creditor's
claim would have to be satisfied at the beneficiary's death and before
distribution. It did, however, determine whether the trustee had
power to compromise the judgment.4 7 And the Pennsylvania court
felt unable to act when a trustee asked for a declaration as between
two conflicting exercises of a power of appointment, the sole benefi-
ciary being alive, insane and seventy-eight years of age, possibility
of her having issue not being extinct, inadequate parties, and no
actual controversy.48
Other procedural difficulties were faced in three cases. In Flor-
ida, a specific statutory remedy to enable legatees to obtain legacies
" Brinkley v. Blivins, 160 S. E. 23 (Va., 1931).
'Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829(1931).
' Di Fabio v. Southland, 150 Atl. 248 (N. J. Eq., 1930).
" Bach v. Grabfelder, 250 N. Y. Supp. 552, 1016 (App. Div., 1931).
" Sadler v. Mitchell, 162 Tenn. 363, 36 S. W. (2d) 891 (1931).
"Re Estate of Cryan, 301 Pa. 386, 152 At. 675, 71 A. L. R. 1417 (1930).
" Nashville Trust Co. v. Dake, 162 Tenn. 356, 36 S. W. (2d) 905 (1931).
'in re Sterrett's Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 150 Atl. 159 (1930).
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without bond was viewed as not so exclusive as to deprive the legatee
of the power to seek a declaration to like effect. 49 An Arizona court
having entered a declaratory judgment that an administrator was
entitled to a lien on land for improvements made by the deceased, his
subsequent suit for the money was successful, the lien being therein
foreclosed. 50 But where an executor had secured a construction of
the will and an' order to sell land in an earlier action, a later declar-
atory judgment proceeding between the heirs (who had received
under the first construction per capita) and their prospective pur-
chasers was not allowed in Kentucky to serve as a test of the pro-
priety of the first adjudication.51
Insurance policies. An accident insurance policy 52 protecting a
now insolvent railroad was construed in New York at the instance of
the railroad's receiver and of persons who had causes of action
against the railroad, as against the insurer, to determine whether
liability under the policy attached only after the railroad had actually
paid as much as $25,000 upon such judgments as may be recovered,
or before. In California,53 one who had purchased a fire insurance
policy from a person who had absconded with the premiums suc-
cessfully sought a declaration as to whether the insurer was respon-
sible. But in two cases, the Kentucky court refused to make a
declaration, in one case 54 because of inadequate pleadings, in the
other5 5 because of insufficient facts in evidence. The first involved
the construction of a fraternal benefit policy, the second the disposi-
tion of the proceeds of war risk insurance.
Leases have been construed, usually as between the lessee and the
lessor, to determine the validity of a lease of municipal property for
a theatre ;56 the depth to which the lessee was required to drill under
an oil lease ;57 the precise date of the lease's termination ;58 whether
"Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930).
W Lisitzky v. Brady, 300 Pac. 177 (Ariz., 1931).
" Back's Guardian v. Bards, 234 Ky. 211, 27 S. W. (2d) 960 (1930).
"2 Post v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 541, 173 N. E. 857 (1930).
' Frasch v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 2 Pac. (2d) 147 (Calif.,
1931).
Supreme Tent of the Knights of the Maccabees v. Dupriest, 235 Ky. 46,
29 S. W. (2d) 599 (1930).
Mason's Adm'r. v. Mason's Guardian, 39 S. W. (2d) 211 (Ky., 1931).
' Woodward v. Fox West Coast Theatre, 36 Ariz. 251, 284 Pac. 350 (1930).
A protesting taxpayer was also a defendant.
Jones v. Interstate Oil Co., 1 Pac. (2d) 1051 (Calif., 1931).
Fidelity & C. Trust Co. v. Levin, 128 Misc. 838, 221 N. Y. Supp. 269
(1927), affirmed in 248 N. Y. 551, 162 N. E. 521 (1928). A sublessee was a
party defendant. The action was brought by the lessor.
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the lessee after termination was entitled to a new term of a certain
length or only from year to year ;5 the reasonableness of the land-
lord's withholding of consent to subletting;60 and the power of the
lessee of a theatre for 99 years to demolish it and erect offices. 0'
This last case was almost a duplicate of Willing v. Chicaga Audi-
torium Assn,62 in which the federal courts proved impotent because
no declaratory judgment statute had been enacted by Congress and
because the case could not be fitted into the equity jurisdiction to
remove cloud. In both cases, the original use of the property had
become unprofitable and burdensome. In both, a modern office build-
ing would be a boon to the parties and to the communities. Neither
lease had contemplated such a predicament. In each case, the uncer-
tainty as to whether demolition would work a forfeiture made fi-
nancing of the new project impossible.
Miscellaneous. Rights of abutting property owners in a street
laid out through a subdivision were determined upon a cross-com-
plaint to an injunction proceeding, in Connecticut. 3 Similarly, the
Wisconsin court 4 determined the relative interests of a riparian
owner who desired to erect a structure over an interstate river, and
the state, whose Railroad Commission's protest had caused the War
Department to refuse a permit. At the instance of the personal rep-
resentative of a stockholder as against the corporation, the New
York court 5 determined whether the defendant was a stock or a
membership corporation, the legality of a number of its acts, the
relative rights and duties of members and the company, and whether
the corporation was still in existence. Where one Waggoner caused
six New York banks to deposit an aggregate of a half million dollars
in a seventh New York bank to the credit of a Colorado bank of
which he was president, and which failed shortly after, by means of
forged telegrams from Denver correspondents, upon which credit
the defunct bank drew to pay past debts, the rights of all the parties,
an accounting, and appropriate judgments for amounts due were
"Aaron v. Woodcock, 283 Pa. 33, 128 Atl. 665 (1925). But see Nelson v.
Burns, 255 Ill. App. 314 (1930) (courts do not construe leases before cause of
action arises for purpose of guiding litigants in some future course of conduct.)
Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N. .Y. Supp. 760 (1925).
Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618
(1930).
' Supra note 25.
Merino v. George Fish, Inc., 153 AtI. 301 (Conn., 1931).
S. S. Kresge Co. v. R. R. Comm., 235 N. W. 4 (Wis., 1931).
" Bartlett v. Lily Dale Assembly, 139 Misc. 338, 249 N. Y. Supp. 482 (1931).
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handled by the New York court under a declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding. 66
Nuisances. A printshop was denied a declaration in New York
to the effect that it was not a public nuisance.67 The Michigan court
refused a householder a declaration that no person had a right to
park cars in front of his premises so as to interfere with his right of
access.68  No ordinance forbade this conduct. An ordinance did
require police to remove cars after they had stood 48 hours. Plain-
tiff asked for a declaration that it was the duty of the police to assist
him in his plight, and that this ordinance was void for unreasonable-
ness. The action was against the city. The Pennsylvania court was
unwilling to make a declaration as to how a large garage in a residen-
tial section could be so used in connection with a large apartment
house as not to become a nuisance. 69 An injunction had already been
obtained against the operation of the garage so as to be a public
nuisance.
Public Officers. A county jailer having refused to comply with
his county's demand for a fiscal report, he obtained a declaration as
against the county respecting his duty to report, whether he had to
pay for light, heat and laundry for the jail, and whether receipts for
federal prisoners were to be included in his compensation. 70 But
where a building permit expired without having been acted upon
before the final decree below, the Massachusetts court dismissed
declaratory judgment proceedings brought by the municipality to
declare the permit void, the question having become moot.71 The
Kentucky court refused to entertain a taxpayers' suit for a declaration
that persons nominated for certain city offices had disqualified them-
selves by campaign promises to delegate their duties and salaries to
a proposed city manager, because the court could not place the sub-
ject matter within any of the categories mentioned in the Declaratory
Judgment Act, and because no controversy existed with reference to
plaintiff's rights.72 The Colorado court could find no controversy
National City Bank et al v. Waggoner et al, 230 App. Div. 88, 243 N. Y_
Supp. 299 (1930).
' Cuneo Eastern Press v. Astrowsky, 246 N. Y. Supp. 510 (App. Div., 1930).
The case is inadequately reported.
Heinze v. City of Detroit, 250 Mich. 597, 231 N. W. 51 (1930).
Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 At. 274 (1928).
" Holland v. Fayette County, 41 S. W. (2d) 651 (1931).
" Town of Swampscott v. Knowlton Arms, Inc., 172 N. E. 601 (Mass.,
1930).
" Dietz v. Zimmer et al, 231 Ky. 546, 21 S. W. (2d) 999 (1929).
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to sustain a city's suit for a declaration that a proposed plan
of sewerage benefit assessments would if adopted be valid. 73 Nor
could the Pennsylvania court, in a suit by certain directors of the
poor, to determine the validity under conflicting statutes, of an as yet
wholly prospective scheme of poor law administration.74
Status. A declaratory judgment in New York determined the
plaintiff's claim that she was the illegitimate child of the defendant,
an unmarried woman, for purposes of inheritance, citizenship and
the right of franchise. 7 5 A matrimonial status was protected under
these circumstances: The plaintiff's husband, after a Yucatan divorce,
remarried in Connecticut. The declaration was sought in New York
as against the husband and the second wife. An injunction against
the defendants holding themselves out as husband and wife, how-
ever, was denied, as involving no substantial right of the original
wife.76
Statutes and ordinances. Section 2 of the Declaratory Judgment
Act specifically authorizes declarations of rights, status and other
legal relations arising under or involving the construction or validity
of statutes, ordinances and franchises. Sec. 8 provides, in part: "In
any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance
or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall be en-
titled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged
to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the State shall also be
served with a copy of the proceeding and shall be entitled to be
heard." Heretofore, in both state and federal courts, the principal
method of testing the applicability or constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances, in advance of a violation thereof, has been by an injunc-
tion against their enforcement. The availability of this remedy, how-
ever, has depended upon various notions of the effect of the supposed
adequacy of the alternative of raising the question as a defense in
a criminal prosecution, after the statute or ordinance has been
"Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo. 198, 274 Pac. 743 (1929).
*' Reese v. Adamson, 297 Pa. 13, 146 Atl. 262 (1929).
Morecroft v. Taylor, 229 App. Div. 562, 234 N. Y. Supp. 2 (1929).
"'Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929). McCalmont
v. McCalmont, 93 Pa. Super. Ct. 203 (1928), refusing a declaration as to the
validity of petitioner's marriage to the defendant, she (the defendant) having
been forbidden to remarry by a divorce decree entered in another state, is based
upon the unwise Pennsylvania and New Hampshire judicial innovation that a
declaratory judgment may not be had where another adequate remedy is avail-
able. See 9 U. L. A., 1930 Pocket Supp. 115; Lisbon Village v. Town of Lis-
bon, 155 At. 252 (N. H., 1931).
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violated.7 7 Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, that criterion has
no place.
Thus, as between an elective judicial officer and the Secretary of
State who refused to certify that plaintiff's office was one of those to
be filled at a general election, the applicability of a state constitutional
amendment to those elected the day the amendment was adopted, was
determined by declaratory judgment proceedings. 78
Tax problems have been adjusted by means of declarations as to
the constitutionality of a statute relating to review of municipal tax
levies by a state board; 79 and as to the power of a county to tax the
plant and distribution facilities of a water company whose pumping
station was in another county.80 New Hampshire held8 l this to be
the wrong remedy to determine the defendant town's jurisdiction to
tax the plaintiff, another remedy being available, but treated the
declaratory judgment proceeding as if it had been the other action.
Other statutory declarations have been in relation to the constitu-
tionality of legislation restricting pharmacy ownership registrations to
licensed pharmacists ;82 to the applicability to new community schools
of statutes requiring district school board room guaranties ;83 and to
the validity of municipal bonds under a "calamity act."84  But no
controversy was presented by the petition of a weekly newspaper
publisher against a probate judge to determine whether the plaintiff's
"Note (1930) 9 N. C. L. Rav. 73. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. City of
Charlottesville, 42 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) (opinion by Circuit Judge
John J. Parker, injunction against enforcement of zoning ordinance granted,
because penalty provided for violation so high as to make test in defense to
criminal prosecution oppressive) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510,
69 L. ed. 1070, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925) (injunction granted against enforcement
anti-parochial school law two years before law was to become effective). See
Borchard, op. cit. supra note 18, at his page 586 et. seq.
"Wingate v. Flynn, 139 Misc. 779, 249 N: Y. Supp. 351 (1931).
"Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N. E. 186, 70 A. L. R. 1232 (Ind., 1930) (suit be-
tween taxpayers and state board and city).
'Joplin Waterworks Co. v. Jasper County, 38 S. W. (2d) 1068 (Mo.,
1931). This was a submission of an agreed controversy, but it was held that
the fact that an agreed case was submitted amicably did not render the cause
moot or collusive.
"Lisbon Village District v. Town of Lisbon, 155 Atl. 252 (N. H., 1931).
Pratter v. Lascoff, 140 Misc. 211, 249 N. Y. Supp. 211 (1931) (action be-
tween applicant and state board of pharmacy.)
"School Dist. No. 19 v. Sheridan Community High School, 130 Kan. 421,
286 Pac. 230 (1930).
" Muskegon Heights v. Danigelis, 253 Mich. 260, 235 N. W. 83, 73 A. L. R.
696 (1931) (suit between city and two taxpayers). Compare the North Caro-
lina controversy without action, note 9 supra.
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paper was within the statutory class of periodicals in which legal
notices could be printed.8 5
Zoning ordinances have been tested as to constitutionality and con-
struction in at least two cases.8 6 Similarly, as to the persons affected
by an ordinance regulating movers of household goods.87
The Kansas court8 8 combined quo warranto and the declaratory
judgment proceeding, to test the validity of an ordinance granting a
franchise to an electric utility, the charge being that it had not been
approved by the necessary number of voters.
Supplemental remedy. The Pennsylvania court has twice refused
the use of the declaratory judgment as an indirect modification or
clarification of a judgment or decree previously rendered in another
action between the parties. One8 9 involved a consent judgment fix-
ing the price at which a city was to have a waterworks. The electors
thereafter voted down the proposal to buy. Seven years later they
changed their minds. The city demanded the plant at the judgment
figure. The water company asked for a declaration as to the effect of
the judgment. The court held as above stated but uttered a dictum
that the adverse vote invalidated the consent judgment. The other 90
concerned an injunction decree forbidding the use of a garage so as
to constitute a nuisance. The defendant sought a declaration whether
a proposed type of use would be free from the charge of contempt.
The question was viewed as so prospective as to be moot. In Ken-
tucky,91 a county, having instituted an action against the county at-
torney for money alleged to have been received by him, sought a
declaration in a second action as to six points of law relating to the
merits, to the burden of proof, and to the statute of limitations, affect-
ing the earlier suit. It was regarded as an application for legal advice
to guide the county in its conduct of the main action, and relief was
refused. The provision of the Uniform Act that "further relief
based upon a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted when-
ever necessary or proper . . ." was held inapplicable to the original
action for declaratory relief.
" Garden City News v. Hurst, 129 Kan. 365, 282 Pac. 720 (1929).
Faulkner v. City of Keene, 155 Atl. 197 (N. H., 1931) ; Taylor v. Haver-
ford Tp., 299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639 (1930).
" Dowdy v. City of Covington, 25 S. W. 304 (Ky. 1931).
City of Manhattan v. United Power & Light Co., 129 Kan. 592, 283 Pac.
919 (1930).
City of Williamsport v. Williamsport Water Co., 300 Pa. 439, 150 Atl. 652
(1930).
'Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 At. 274 (1928). And see note 51.
" Jefferson County v. Chilton, 236 Ky. 614, 33 S. W. (2d) 601 (1930).
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For other cases showing the relations of declaratory judgments to
other proceedings, see the cases noted above under Contract., (arbi-
tration), at note 38; under Deeds (execution) at note 40, (specific
performance) at note 43; under Estates (review prior construction
will) at note 51 ; and under Status (annullment) at note 76.
But there have been several instances where declaratory judg-
ments have been successfully sought by way of cross-action or coun-
terclaim. 92
In conclusion, three suggestions are respectfully ventured:
(a) That declaratory judgment problems be solved, not out of the
inner consciousness of the bar and bench, but upon the basis of a
study of the best and worst decisions and practice of other jurisdic-
tions. 93 (b) That in cases where the merits of substantive questions
presented by declaratory judgment proceedings are weak, disposition
be put upon that ground, without generalizations likely to impair the
scope of the utility of the procedural device itself. (c) That the
judiciary take seriously the words of section 12 of the Declaratory
Judgment Act: "This Act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect
to rights, status, and other legal relations, and it is to be liberally
construed and administered."
"E.g., Merino v. Fish, 153 Atl. 301 (Conn., 1931); Braman v. Babcock, 98
Conn. 549, 120 At. 150 (1923). The English and Canadian cases are discussed
in Martin, The Declaratory Judgment, 9 CAN. BAR REV. 540, 541 (October,
1931).
"The American Digest System, beginning with the 3rd Decennial, classifies
declaratory judgment cases under Actions, Key No. 6; excellent annotations,
classifying the cases prior to 1930 by subject matter are to be found in 68 A. L.
R 110, 50 A. L. R. 42, 19 A: L. IL 1124, and 12 A. L. IL 52; brief treatise dis-
cussions are FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, (5th ed., 1925) §§1353-1356, and CLARK,
CODE PLEADING, 230-235 (1928). And see 9 UmNFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, 1930
Pocket Supplement, 112-117.
